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1. Budget  cuts in Europe:  contractionary  or expansionary? 
In most European countries,  the high real interest rates of the early 1980s 
combined  with the large stock of public debt inherited from the 1970s to 
create a potentially  explosive  debt problem.  As governments  started to 
tackle the problem with contractionary fiscal policies,  public officials and 
economists  voiced  different beliefs about the likely effects of these  mea- 
sures.  In Denmark,  for example,  while  the Parliament was  discussing  a 
package  of severe  budget  cuts in January 1983, the Ministry of Finance 
anticipated  that the fiscal contraction would  "dampen private consump- 
tion," in truly Keynesian  fashion: 
Curtailing domestic demand will  lead to a temporary  increase in unemploy- 
ment . . . and will have a dampening  effect  on business  fixed investment. . . . It 
is to be expected  that the Government's  policy will secure  a marked  reduction  in 
the deficit  on the current  account  of the balance  of payments. (Danish Ministry of 
Finance, 1983) 
The German Council of Economic Experts, on the contrary, proposed  the 
view  that the impact  of budget  deficits  on demand  was  predominantly 
negative  (Sachverstandigenrat  1981), so that fiscal retrenchment  should 
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be seen as the premise  for an expansion,  rather than a recession.  In their 
retrospective  account  of  the  German  fiscal  consolidation,  Fels  and 
Froehlich (1986, pp.  184-85)  summarize  this anti-Keynesian  view: 
Fiscal consolidation  had a benign impact on expectations . ..  [An] important 
explanation is the way fiscal consolidation  was actually brought  about. Rather 
than raising taxes, the deficit was reduced by keeping a lid on expenditure 
growth . . . By absorbing  a smaller share of GNP, the public  sector made room 
for the private sector to expand. 
In a later reappraisal of that experience,  Hellwig  and Neumann  (1987, 
pp. 137-38) take an eclectic stance, merging the Keynesian and the "Ger- 
man" views  on budget  cutting: 
According to conventional wisdom, any policy of consolidation  is likely to con- 
tract real aggregate demand in  the shorter run.  This Keynesian conclusion, 
however,  is misleading as it neglects the role of expectations.  A more adequate 
analysis differentiates  between  the direct demand  effect  of cutting the growth of 
government  expenditure  and the indirect  effect  of an induced  change  in expecta- 
tions. The direct demand impact of slower public expenditure  growth is clearly 
negative . . . The indirect  effect  on aggregate  demand  of the initial reduction  in 
expenditure  growth occurs through  an improvement  in expectations  if the mea- 
sures taken are understood to be part of a credible  medium-run  program  of 
consolidation, designed to  permanently reduce the share of government in 
GDP .  . . [and thus] taxation in the  future. 
Only the empirical evidence  can clarify which of these two contending 
views  about fiscal policy  is more appropriate-or,  in Hellwig  and Neu- 
mann's terms, how  often the contractionary Keynesian effect of a spend- 
ing cut prevails  on its expansionary  expectational  effect. The aim of this 
paper is precisely  to bring new  evidence  to bear on this issue: we  draw 
on some  of the  data generated  by the European exercise in fiscal recti- 
tude  of the  1980s, and  focus  on its two  most  extreme cases-Denmark 
and Ireland. 
The European experience  is especially rich, not only because the sever- 
ity  of  budget  cutting  varied  widely  across  countries,  but  because  the 
relative contributions  of taxes and  spending  to the final outcome  were 
quite different.  Figure 1 shows  that some  countries  were  able to imple- 
ment a very substantial  turnaround  of the budget  over the years 1981 to 
1989 (for the United Kingdom,  that was an "early starter," the interval is 
1979-89).  In Ireland, Denmark,  Sweden,  Belgium, and the United King- 
dom,  the budgetary  position  of the public sector improved  by amounts Can Severe  Fiscal Contractions  Be Expansionary?  ?  77 
Figure 1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO FISCAL STABILIZATION 
Changes  in the Ratio to GDP Between  1981 and  1989 
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ranging  from 6.6  to 3% of GDP. In other  countries,  like Germany  and 
France,  the  improvement  in  the  budget  was  negligible,  while  in  the 
Netherlands  the deficit actually increased.  The contribution of taxes was 
relatively  more important  in Ireland,  Denmark,  Sweden,  and Belgium, 
while  most  of the action in Germany came from cuts in current spend- 
ing.  In the  Netherlands  the  effect  of reduced  government  expenditure 
was more than offset by tax cuts; Italy and Spain, instead,  raised spend- 
ing  while  relying  entirely  on  tax  revenue  to  improve  the  budget-a 
policy that resembles  that of the United States. 
Table 1 describes  the  response  of real private  consumption  to these 
fiscal shocks.  The regressions  in the table are not to be seen as estimates of 
a structural model,  but rather as a way to summarize the main correlations 
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Table  1  EFFECTS  OF  FISCAL  CONSOLIDATION  ON PRIVATE 
CONSUMPTIONa  (regression  on stacked  data  for  10  countries,  1973-89) 
Lagged  Durbin's h 
C/Y*  T*/Y*  G/Y'  M/Y*  R2  sign. level 
Constrained 
estimates 
(1)  .86**  -.08*  -.23**  .93  .3E-6 
(2)  .81**  -.08*  -.18*  .08**  .94  .2E-5 
Unconstrained 
estimates: 
(3)  .72**  .95  .17 
Belgium  .01  .59  .11 
Denmark  -.56**  -.17  .53** 
France  -.20  -.37  -.42 
Germany  -.34  -.12  .01 
Ireland  -.01  -.49**  .26** 
Italy  -.41  3.43  .03* 
Netherl.  -.63*  -2.00*  -.21* 
Spain  .02  -.44*  .27** 
Sweden  .25  -.43  .15 
U.K.  -.48  -1.66*  .02 
a All regressions  use 170 observations.  In each regression  the dependent variable  is real private  con- 
sumption  C as a share of potential  output Y*  (obtained  by fitting  an exponential  trend  on 1973-89  real 
GDP). T* are cyclically  corrected  taxes net of transfers  and subsidies, G is public consumption.  In 
regressions  (2)  and (3) the regressors  include  also real  money (M2)  as a share  of potential  output, (MIP)I 
Y*:  in (2)  its coefficient  is constrained  to be the same for  all countries;  in (3)  it is left  unconstrained  across 
countries.  In addition, each regression  includes a constant,  a proxy  for the international  cycle (devia- 
tions of OECD  growth from  trend)  and country  dummies  on these two regressors.  The corresponding 
estimates  are not reported  to save space. One (two) asterisk(s)  indicates  that the regressor  is signifi- 
cantly  different  from  zero at the 10%  (5%)  level. Data  sources:  OECD  National  Income  Accounts,  except 
for T*,  which was provided  by the EC. 
taxes  net  of transfers  and  subsidies,1  government  consumption,  and  a 
proxy for the  international  cycle; in regressions  (2) and  (3) real money 
balances are also added  to the list of regressors.  All variables (except for 
the international  cycle proxy) are measured  relative to potential GDP. 
Taxes appear to correlate negatively  with  private consumption:  in re- 
gressions  (1) and  (2), where  the coefficients  on the policy  variables are 
constrained  to be  the  same  across  countries,  the coefficient  on taxes is 
negative and significant; and it is generally negative (though often impre- 
cisely  estimated)  also  in  regression  (3), where  it is  left unconstrained 
across  countries.  Real  money  balances  are  positively  correlated  with 
private consumption  and are often significant. 
1. The cyclical correction of net taxes is intended  to eliminate  most of the endogeneity  of 
taxes. Figures for cyclically corrected taxes were provided  by the EC; their construction 
is described  in European  Economy,  1984, no. 22, (chapter 6). Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  *  79 
So  far, the  data  are consistent  with  the  predictions  of  a Keynesian 
textbook.  Increases  in government  spending,  however,  display  a nega- 
tive relationship  with consumption.  This result hides considerable cross- 
country  variation; the  unconstrained  estimates  in regression  (3), show 
that  this  negative  correlation  is  strong  and  significant  in  some  of  the 
countries  where,  according  to Figure 1, there were  sharp cuts in public 
spending-Ireland,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  Netherlands.  In no 
country is the coefficient  of public spending  positive  and significant. 
Figure 2 provides  an alternative  way  to describe the relationship  be- 
tween  spending  cuts  and  private  domestic  demand.  The  figure  plots 
yearly  changes  in  the  sum  of  private  consumption  and  investment 
against changes  in public spending,  both measured  relative to potential 
GDP. Data referring to the early and late 1980s are displayed  separately, 
Figure  2 PRIVATE  DEMAND  AND PUBLIC  CONSUMPTION 
Changes Relative to Potential  Output 
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since  in  many  countries  the  two  subperiods  have  coincided  with  two 
distinct waves  of spending  cuts.  Dates vary somewhat  across countries 
to capture the years when  fiscal action was more evident.  Figure 2 shows 
that the recession  of the early 1980s was equally severe in countries that 
cut public spending  and those  that did not.  The only exception  is Den- 
mark, where the ratio of public spending  to potential output fell dramati- 
cally in 1983-84,  but private domestic  demand  grew vigorously.  Instead, 
in the recovery  of the late 1980s, there seems  to be a negative  relation- 
ship between  private domestic  demand  and public consumption:  all the 
observations  for this subperiod  lie in the second and fourth quadrants of 
the  figure  (with  the  only  exceptions  of  Spain  and  the  United  States). 
Among  these,  Ireland stands  out as the most prominent  example  of an 
expansionary  cut in public spending. 
This  negative  correlation  between  private  and  public  spending  can 
hardly be credited to an endogenous  response  of public spending  to the 
cyclical behavior  of  income;  our  spending  variable is  defined  as  pur- 
chases  of goods  and services  by the public sector, and does  not include 
such  cyclical components  as transfers and subsidies.  In addition,  most 
accounts  of the spending  cuts that have occurred in Europe in the 1980s 
point  to an exogenous  shift in policy, often  associated  with  a change  in 
government,  rather than to an endogenous  response  of policymakers to 
an improved  economic  performance. 
This  suggests  that  the  "German view"  of  negative  fiscal multipliers 
cannot  be  easily  dismissed-at  least  for the  countries  where  spending 
cuts were sharpest.  According  to this view, however,  what should  make 
a difference  is not only the magnitude  of current spending  cuts, but their 
expected  persistence; only  reductions  in  spending  that are expected  to 
persist  can yield  permanently  lower  taxes  (Barro 1979, 1981, Feldstein 
1982).  To assess  the  expected  persistence  of  spending  cuts,  we  have 
fitted rolling univariate ARIMA processes  to real government  consump- 
tion series  of Denmark,  Ireland, and Germany; the forecasts have been 
used  to compute  the present  discounted  value (PDV) of predicted public 
consumption,  that provides  a measure  of "permanent spending."2 The 
results are reported in Figure 3. For all three countries the spending  cuts 
2. The ARIMA processes  were  selected  on the basis of a standard Box-Jenkins identifica- 
tion search.  After analysing  the correlation and partial autocorrelation functions  of the 
series,  we  discriminated  among  the  models  on  the basis of the adjusted  R2, of the Q- 
statistics for the first ten lags of the residuals,  and of in-sample predictive efficiency. This 
search was repeated for each year, after adding the corresponding  observation.  We have 
then used  each estimated  process  to generate  dynamic  forecasts of public consumption 
for 150 steps  (years) ahead at each date, and then computed  the PDV of this flow using a 
5% discount  rate. A similar procedure  is followed  in Ahmed  (1987). See also Seater and 
Mariano (1985). Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  ?  81 
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of the 1980s are associated  with lower permanent  spending.  The drop is 
more sudden  in Germany  and in Denmark,  where  it is concentrated  in 
1981 and in 1982-84  respectively;  it is rnore gradual in Ireland, where  it 
spreads almost over the entire decade. 
This evidence  consistently  points  to the experiences  of Denmark and 
Ireland as the two most striking cases of "expansionary stabilizations" in 
Europe. In Denmark,  the fiscal turnaround of 1982 was accompanied  by 
an unusually  strong expansion  in the subsequent  four years. In Ireland a 
similar outcome  occurred during the 1987 to 1989 stabilization, although 
a previous  attempt  in  the  early  1980s had  plunged  the  economy  in  a 
severe recession. 
Denmark and Ireland, thus,  offer a good testing ground to sort out the 
issues.  Why  does  the  experience  of Denmark  so sharply contradict the 
Keynesian  prediction  about  the  effects  of  a fiscal contradiction?  What 
accounts  for the early failure and later success  of the Irish stabilization? 82 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
The challenge  posed  by these  experiences  goes  beyond  the interpreta- 
tion of  "what really happened"  in each  of these  countries.  It offers an 
opportunity  to identify  the conditions  under which  severe fiscal contrac- 
tions  can  be  expansionary.  This  opportunity  is  all the  more  valuable 
because,  in spite  of all the  discussion  about the  German view  of fiscal 
policy, so far, to our knowledge,  no evidence  has been brought to bear 
on its empirical relevance. 
We begin,  in Section  2, by reviewing  the key facts about the Danish 
and Irish experiments,  highlighting  the importance of the monetary and 
exchange  rate policies  that accompanied  the fiscal stabilization.  Next,  in 
Section  3,  we  discuss  how  the  surge  of  private  consumption  can  be 
related to these  policy  shocks.  We attack this problem in two  steps.  In 
the first step,  we investigate  to what extent the increase in consumption 
can be explained  by the direct  effects  of policy shifts, acting via changes in 
current taxes,  spending,  and asset prices. The three channels  we exam- 
ine  are: (1) the  fall in disposable  income  due  to the increase in current 
taxes; (2) the  wealth  effect  due  to the  fall in nominal  and  real interest 
rates; (3) the  reduced  provision  of public services  to consumers.  In the 
second  step  we  consider  if the portion of the surge in consumption  left 
unexplained  by  the  change  in  current  variables  can  be  attributed  to 
changes  in  expectations about future fiscal policy, along  the  lines  of  the 
German view. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss to what extent the extraor- 
dinary performance  of private investment  in Denmark can be related to 
the stabilization package. 
2. Tales  of two  expansionary  contractions 
The similarity among  the stabilization policies adopted by Denmark and 
Ireland in the  1980s does  not reside only in the sheer magnitude  of the 
fiscal turnaround.  In both cases,  cuts in spending  and tax increases were 
accompanied  by a shift in the balance of political power, and by comple- 
mentary monetary and exchange rate policies; after an initial devaluation, 
both countries  pegged  their currencies to the German mark, inducing  a 
sharp monetary  disinflation,  and liberalized capital flows. 
Each of these  complementary  policy  moves  had an important role in 
determining  the final outcome  of the stabilization; the effects of the fiscal 
turnaround  cannot  be  understood  if  they  are not  placed  against  the 
backdrop of the accompanying  monetary  and exchange  rate policies.  In 
the 1970s, these  countries had experienced  not only large budget deficits 
but high  rates  of  inflation  and  currency  depreciation.  In the  stabiliza- 
tions  of the  1980s, monetary  tightening  was  invariably the first step  of 
the  plan:  Central  Banks  moved  first,  while  political  parties  were  still Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  ?  83 
wrangling  to gather enough  social consensus  to cut spending  and raise 
taxes.  The monetary  contraction  did not take place by reducing  money 
supply  growth,  as in the  United  States  and  Britain in  1979-80,  but by 
using the exchange  rate vis-a-vis  the German mark as a nominal anchor. 
The sudden  disinflation  led to a deterioration of the financial position 
of the public sector, through  the loss  of seigniorage  and the increase in 
the  real cost  of servicing  fixed-rate  debt  issued  when  nominal  interest 
rates were high.  This heightened  the sense of urgency about the need for 
a fiscal correction.  Prompt fiscal action was required also for the success 
of the monetary  stabilization itself, since,  for the currency to be success- 
fully  pegged  to the  mark,  the  danger  of future  monetization  of public 
debt had to be ruled out.  A sharp reduction  of the deficit could contrib- 
ute  to the  long-run  credibility  of the  exchange  rate, providing  a signal 
that the government  would  meet its obligations via tax revenue or spend- 
ing cuts, and dispense  with  seigniorage. 
2.1 DENMARK 
In 1982 Danish public debt was growing  rapidly (from 29% of GDP at the 
beginning  of 1980 to 65% at the end of 1982), fueled by high real interest 
rates and large primary deficits (3.1% of GDP). The deficit was the result 
of the government's  attempt to boost demand  in the middle of the world 
recession  of the early 1980s. Despite  the stimulus  to aggregate  demand, 
unemployment  was  4.2  percentage  points  higher  relative to  1979, and 
the current account had worsened,  bringing external debt from 17.5% to 
33% of GDP over the  same  interval.  In October 1982 long-term  interest 
rates reached 22%, while  inflation was only 10%;  in the presence  of such 
astronomical  real interest  rates,  the public  started questioning  the sus- 
tainability of public debt, while  S&P added  a "credit watch" to the AAA 
rating of Danish  foreign  debt. 
At that time,  a Conservative  coalition formed a new  government,  and 
adopted  a draconian program of fiscal retrenchment.  Within four years, 
the turnaround  in the full-employment  primary budget  was  as large as 
10% of GDP, of which  2.8% was  accounted  for by a fall in government 
consumption,  0.4% by cuts in government  investment,  and the rest by 
discretionary increases  in taxes net of transfers.'The improvement  in the 
actual primary budget  was  an even  more  dramatic 15.4%. As a result, 
the debt-GDP ratio started declining. 
In  the  monetary  area,  the  fiscal  package  was  accompanied  by  the 
announcement  that the  exchange  rate of the Danish  kroner versus  the 
German mark would  henceforth  be fixed. The credibility of the commit- 
ment to a fixed parity was enhanced  by the gains of competitiveness  that 
Denmark  had  attained  since  the  inception  of  the  EMS through  a  se- 84 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
quence of devaluations.  The new  government  strengthened  the credibil- 
ity of its announcement  with two signals.  A few months  after coming  to 
office (in March 1983) there was  a general EMS realignment; for the first 
time  since  joining  the  system,  the  Danish  authorities  refrained  from 
devaluing  the kroner, and thus effectively  abandoned  the "weak curren- 
cies camp" (see  Christensen  1986 and  Andersen  and Risager 1987). At 
the  same  time,  they  removed  exchange  controls; restrictions on capital 
inflows  were  abolished  immediately,  and  controls  on  outflows  were 
phased  out over the subsequent  two years (Thygesen  1985). 
The term structure of Danish  interest rates around the announcement 
of  the  stabilization,  shown  in  Figure  4,  offers  some  evidence  on  the 
credibility of the  new  policy.  When  the  government  passed  the  test  of 
the March 1983 realignment,  the long-term  interest rate fell sharply-by 
5.5% in  two  months.  (The  gap  with  German  rates,  however,  did  not 
actually close; as late as 1986, the differential was still 4.6%.) 
As  mentioned  in  Section  1, rather than  reducing  aggregate  demand 
and income,  the severe Danish  contraction was accompanied by an aver- 
age growth of 3.6% in real GDP over the years from 1983 to 1986. Growth 
was driven by domestic  demand; private consumption  increased rapidly 
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in spite  of the reduction  of disposable  income  due  to higher taxes,  and 
investment  boomed  spectacularly  (see Table 2). 
In the econometric  model  of the Danish  Central Bank, the increase in 
consumption  appears  to be  remarkably well  tracked by its  correlation 
with wealth  (Christensen  1988). In fact, as shown  by Figure 5, consump- 
Table  2  KEY  STATISTICS  ON THE  DANISH  AND IRISH  STABILIZATIONSa 
(percentage  values per year) 
Denmark  Ireland 
1979-82  1983-86  1979-81  1982-84  1987-89 
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a  Source: All  data  are  drawn  from  OECD  National  Income  Accounts,  except  the  cyclically  adjusted 
budget  balance,  described  in footnote  1, and for nominal interest rates, which for Denmark are average 
yields on long-term  government  bonds  (from European  Economy),  and for Ireland are yields on five-year 
government  bonds  (from the Quarterly  Bulletin of the Central  Bank  of Ireland).  b The methodology  used  to construct ex-ante real rates is described in footnote  2. 
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Figure  5a DENMARK:  WEALTH  AND PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION 
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tion and wealth  reacted with  striking simultaneity  to the announcement 
of the  stabilization  plan  in the  fall of  1982. The increase  in the market 
value of wealth3 was  mostly  due to the increase in house  prices. Figures 
6a and  6b  suggest  that  the  jump  in  the  value  of  equity  (houses  and 
shares) was related to the sharp fall in real interest rates that occurred in 
early 1983, at the time of the EMS realignment.4 
As shown  in Figure 5b, public debt also played a role in the increase of 
households'  wealth.  As  we  show  in Section  3, there were  two  reasons 
for the increase in the market value of debt: the fall in expected  inflation 
raised  the  real value  of the  future interest  payments  on nominal  debt, 
and the fall in the real interest rate decreased  the discount  rate applying 
to the real value  of those  interest  payments.  This was  compounded  by 
the fact that most  of the  outstanding  debt had very long  maturities: at 
the  time  of  the  stabilization,  Treasury Bills accounted  for  15% of  the 
Danish  domestic  debt; 85% were  fixed-rate bonds  with maturities rang- 
ing from 3 to 20 years,  mostly  issued  when  nominal rates were high.  As 
shown  in Figure  7,  the  long  maturity  "froze" the  average  cost  of debt 
servicing at relatively high levels,  even  after its marginal cost-the  yield 
on new  issues-had  fallen by over 10%. 
At the same time asset prices jumped  and consumption  started to rise, 
there  was  a sharp  turnaround  in  "consumer  confidence"  (Figure 6c).5 
The  rise  in  consumer  confidence  may  have  resulted  partly  from  the 
increase  in  financial  and  real wealth,  and  partly from optimism  about 
future  income;  it is  impressive  that  this  wave  of  consumer  optimism 
occurred at a time when  taxes were being dramatically raised, and public 
services curtailed. 
2.2 IRELAND 
The first Irish stabilization  of the early 1980s provides  instead  an exam- 
ple  of the  textbook  case.  In 1981 Irish public  finances  were  in a much 
worse  situation  than those  of Denmark.  As a share of GDP, the primary 
full-employment  budget  deficit was  8.4%, debt  service  absorbed 8.3%, 
and  total national  debt  was  87%. The current account  deficit exceeded 
10% of GDP. The first serious attempt at fiscal adjustment began in 1982: 
3. The data for total wealth, houses, and government  bonds, shown in Figures  5a and 5b, 
are all at market  value and constant  prices. 
4. We constructed ex ante real rates by deflating nominal rates using the forecast for 
inflation from a VAR  for inflation, short and long nominal interest rates on quarterly 
data from 1970 to 1988. The VAR  used to compute the forecast  was reestimated  each 
year. The horizon over which the forecast  is taken  is synchronized  with the maturity  of 
the nominal  interest  rate. 
5. This index is provided by the EC (European  Economy,  Supplement  B). Consumers  are 
asked their views on the "general  situation of the economy."  A similar  picture is ob- 
tained  by employing an index of their  views on their own "financial  situation." 88 * GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
Figure  6a DENMARK:  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  AND REAL  SHARE  PRICE 
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Figure 6b DENMARK: REAL INTEREST  RATE  AND  REAL HOUSE PRICE 
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Figure  6c DENMARK:  INDEX  OF CONSUMERS'  CONFIDENCE 
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by 1984 the full-employment  primary deficit had been reduced by more 
than 7 percentage  points  of GDP, most  of it through  higher  discretion- 
ary taxes  (5.5 percentage  points).  At the  same  time,  the monetary  au- 
thorities embarked  on a sharp disinflation  plan, by pegging  the value of 
the Irish punt  within  the EMS and,  thus,  relative to the German mark. 
Although  this  resulted  in  a  drop  in  both  nominal  and  real  interest 
rates,  house  and  share  prices  declined,  as  shown  in  Figures  8a  and 
8b-contrary  to what  was  happening  in Denmark about the same time. 
The  deflationary  impact  on  domestic  demand  was  tremendous;  real 
private  consumption  fell by  7.1% in  1982 and  remained  almost  flat in 
the  following  two  years.  Business  investment  decreased  dramatically 
from 1982 to  1984,  despite  the  fall in real interest  rates.  The recession 
was  in  no  way  connected  with  a  slowdown  in  external  demand;  as 
shown  in Table 2,  in the  1982-84  period  Irish exports  fared exception- 
ally well on international  markets. 
In spite  of this early failure,  the new  government  elected  in February 
1987, and led by Charles Haughey,  decided  to try again. In contrast with 
the failed stabilization  of 1982, which  had been carried out in the context 90 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
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of a weak  and  quarrelsome  coalition  government,  "Mr. Haughey  flatly 
refused  to enter  deals  with  anyone,  and launched  his minority govern- 
ment  on  the  toughest  austerity  program the  country  had witnessed."6 
Within  two  years  the  full-employment  primary deficit  was  cut  by  an 
additional  7% of GDP. Real growth  resumed,  and for the first time since 
the early 1970s the debt-income  ratio started to decline. 
This  time,  most  of  the  cut  in  the  primary budget  came  from lower 
government  consumption  and goverment  investment,  rather than from 
the  increase  in  discretionary  taxes  as  in  1982  (see  Table 2;  see  also 
McAleese  and McCarthy 1989). Moreover, what increase in tax revenue 
did take place was  obtained  by widening  the tax base via a fiscal reform 
accompanied  by  a  once-and-for-all  tax  amnesty;  in  contrast  with  the 
6. Financial Times, Survey  on  Ireland,  September  24,  1987. For an account  of the  second 
Irish stabilization  see also McAleese  (1990). Seidmann  (1987) argues that because  of the 
fragmentation  of the opposition,  the minority  government  that took office in 1987 was 
much stronger than the coalition governments  of 1982-83. Can Severe  Fiscal Contractions  Be Expansionary?  *  91 
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experience  of the  early  1980s,  marginal  tax rates did not  increase,  and 
actually fell slightly.7 Another  difference with the 1982 experiment  stems 
from the accompanying  exchange  rate policy; the 1987 stabilization was 
preceded  by a sharp devaluation,  while  the earlier attempt had occurred 
at a trough  of Irish competitiveness.  The behavior  of the real exchange 
rate relative to other EMS currencies is illustrated in Figure 9. 
The exchange  rate policy eased the stabilization, however,  not so much 
via its direct effect on external demand, but via its indirect effect on interest 
rates and  domestic  demand.  The  devaluation  stimulated  domestic  de- 
mand by enhancing  the credibility of the new parity and thus producing a 
fall in interest rates; nominal and real rates dropped 5 and 3.4 percentage 
points  respectively  in the course of 1987 (see Figure 8)-an  indication of 
"credibility effects in asset markets" (Dornbusch 1989). Export growth, on 
the contrary, was  the same as during stabilization (see Table 2). 
7. The marginal tax rate for a typical married employee  with two children had been raised 
from 39.5% in 1980 to 43.5% in 1983; it was  reduced  to 42.75% in 1988. Similarly, for a 
typical single  employee  the marginal tax rate went  from 39.5% in 1980 to 68.5% in 1985, 
and declined  to 65.75% in 1988. (Source: OECD Economic  Surveys, Ireland  1988/1989, Table 
A9, p. 97). Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  ?  93 
3. Is there  a consumption  puzzle? 
In Section  2 we  documented  the  importance  of the  monetary  and  ex- 
change rate policies that accompanied  the fiscal stabilizations. By pegging 
the exchange  rate to a low-inflation  currency, the authorities  induced  a 
sharp fall in nominal  and  real interest  rates.  This is because,  once  the 
exchange  rate was credibly fixed, domestic nominal interest rates moved 
toward the lower level of foreign nominal rates. The convergence of nomi- 
nal rates occurred faster than the convergence  of inflation-as  price sticki- 
ness  prevented  the  goods  market from adjusting  at the  same  speed  as 
financial markets,  where  the response  to foreign interest rates had been 
accelerated  by  the  removal  of capital controls.  The result was  that real 
rates of interest fell along with nominal  rates.8 
Households  were thus subjected to two simultaneous  policy shocks: a 
cut in current disposable  income,  due  to the increase  in current taxes, 
and  a wealth  effect,  due  to the  unanticipated  fall in nominal  and  real 
interest rates. These changes  in disposable  income and wealth,  and their 
relative importance,  appear as the natural explanations  for the observed 
behavior of consumption.  The consumption  boom that accompanied  the 
Danish and the second  Irish stabilizations  could have been produced  by 
an increase  in wealth  large  enough  to  overcome  any  possible  contrac- 
tionary effect stemming  from the cut in current disposable  income.  Con- 
versely,  the  drop in private consumption  that occurred during  the first 
Irish stabilization  could be due the absence  of a wealth  effect, as the fall 
in interest rates failed to translate into an increase in asset prices. 
If this interpretation  were to be supported  by the data, there would  be 
no reason to resort to the German view  of fiscal policy to account for our 
episodes  of expansionary  contractions.  Consumption  could be satisfacto- 
rily explained by the direct  effects  of the policy package; there would be no 
consumption  puzzle  to be solved  by appealing  to expectations,  namely  to 
the role of current policy shifts as signals of future policies. 
3.1. THE  DIRECT  EFFECTS  OF THE  STABILIZATION 
The fiscal and monetary  policies  described so far could in principle have 
affected  consumption  through  four direct channels:  (1) the increase  in 
8. This channel,  that relies  on  price stickiness,  is quite  different  from the reason  a fiscal 
stabilization  may  be  accompanied  by  a fall in  real rates  as  explained  in  Drazen  and 
Helpman  (1989). In their model,  the real rate is driven by the anticipated change in the 
marginal utility of consumption;  if the fiscal stabilization occurs through a cut in public 
spending,  the poststabilization  level  of private consumption  will be higher  (because  of 
the implied fall in permanent  taxes) and its marginal utility will be lower. In the presence 
of uncertainty about the exact date of the fiscal stabilization,  households  will not be able 
to avoid a jump in their consumption  path when  the stabilization occurs; accordingly, to 
forgo consumption  prior to the stabilization they will require a higher real rate. 94 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
current taxes,  (2) the fall in expected  inflation,  (3) the fall in real interest 
rates,  and  (4) the  substitution  of  private  consumption  for services  no 
longer supplied  by the government. 
3.1.1.  Taxes and wealth  The  first  three  channels  are  analyzed  in  the 
appendix  using  the eclectic model  of Blanchard (1985), that encompasses 
both  a Ricardian and  a non-Ricardian  world  as special  cases.  If house- 
holds have finite horizons,  a temporary increase  in taxes dampens  private 
consumption;  a fiscal consolidation  designed  to stop the growth  of pub- 
lic debt  by  raising  current  taxes  is  contractionary because,  even  if the 
present value of taxes remains the same, a larger share of it is paid for by 
the current generation.  A fall in expected  inflation  can work in the opposite 
direction; if households  have  finite horizons  and public debt consists  of 
long-term  fixed-rate  nominal  bonds,  a fall in expected  inflation  stimu- 
lates consumption.  This is because  the market value of debt goes up, but 
only  part of  this  capital gain  is  paid  for by  the  current generation  via 
higher taxes.9 Finally, a fall in real  interest  rates  raises wealth and consump- 
tion whether  or not consumers  regard public debt as net worth. If debt is 
considered  as net worth  and consists  of long-term bonds,  however,  the 
positive  wealth  effect  on  consumption  works  also  through  the  capital 
gain  on  long-term  debt  that is  not  fully  offset  by  a corresponding  in- 
crease in future taxes. 
Are these  channels  sufficient  to explain  the observed  pattern of con- 
sumption  in Denmark and Ireland? To answer this question,  we estimate 
conventional  consumption  functions  for the  two  countries  and  inquire 
whether,  depending  on the structure of these relations and the observed 
path of disposable  income and wealth,  we can track consumption  during 
the stabilizations  of the 1980s. 
In the estimation  of consumption  functions we follow the specification 
proposed  by Hayashi  (1982): households'  consumption  of nondurables 
and  services  is  a function  of  its  own  lagged  value,  of lagged  after-tax 
labor earnings,  of current and lagged wealth,  and (to allow for the possi- 
bility  that  some  consumers  are  liquidity-constrained)  of  current  and 
lagged disposable  income.  Public debt is introduced as a separate regres- 
sor, along with other forms of private wealth,  to avoid imposing  a restric- 
tion on the degree  of tax discounting.  The Appendix  shows  the deriva- 
9. This  suggests  that  debt  maturity  can  have  a  peculiar  effect  on  the  budget  in  such 
circumstances.  The  conventional  view  of  policymakers  is  that,  when  the  maturity  of 
public debt is long,  rapid disinflation  makes  fiscal stabilization more difficult by raising 
the real burden  of debt service.  Thus, the longer the maturity of the debt, the larger the 
required turnaround  in the primary deficit. This point,  however,  overlooks  the fact that 
the  wealth  effect  associated  with  the  fall in inflation  raises  private consumption,  and 
thus tax revenue,  providing  at least a partial offset to the increase in debt service. Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  *  95 
tion of this consumption  function,  and the need  to estimate it by nonlin- 
ear instrumental  variables to account for the endogeneity  of wealth  and 
disposable  income  while  imposing  the nonlinear  restrictions implied  by 
the model. 
The results  reported  in Table 3 show  that the model's  restrictions are 
always accepted at conventional  significance levels.  As far as Denmark is 
concerned,  the magnitude  of 0 and the precision  of its estimate indicate 
that the path of wealth  (net of public debt), A(t), significantly affects that 
of private  consumption.  For Ireland,  instead,  net  wealth  is  significant 
only when  disposable  income  is omitted from the regressors. 
The coefficient  on public debt, /3, is instead very imprecisely estimated 
for both countries.  This casts doubt on the proposition  that capital gains 
on public debt have driven consumption  during the 1980s.?1  A warning, 
however,  is in  order: Here  public  debt  should  be  measured  at market 
value,  particularly since we know  there have been large capital gains on 
debt. Such a series is available only for Denmark. For Ireland we have no 
choice but to use data on public debt at book value,  so that our estimates 
for this country  should  be viewed  with  some  skepticism.  Nevertheless, 
there is another piece of evidence  suggesting  that in Ireland capital gains 
on public debt  may  have  no  effect on consumption.  We know  that the 
average  maturity  of Irish public debt  is long  (see  Giavazzi and Pagano 
1989), and  that both  stabilizations  were  accompanied  by a sharp fall in 
nominal  and  real interest  rates; the  market value  of Irish public  debt 
must thus  have jumped  in both stabilizations.  But the two fiscal correc- 
tions had opposite  effects on consumption." 
The estimates  of the  coefficient  L show  that,  while  in Ireland antici- 
pated changes  in current disposable  income  have a substantial effect on 
consumption,  in Denmark  consumption  and current disposable  income 
seem  completely  decoupled.  This difference  between  the two countries 
is  consistent  with  the  dissimilar  response  of  consumption  during  the 
Danish and Irish stabilizations: in Denmark wealth effects sheltered con- 
sumption  from the fall in current disposable  income; in Ireland, instead, 
during  the  first stabilization  consumption  took  all the brunt of higher 
10. Our results for Ireland  appear  to confirm  the finding by Moore  (1987)  that public  debt 
has no role in the Irish  consumption  function. 
11. The only factor  that could restore some credibility  to the hypothesis that public debt 
affects consumption is the fact that Irish households hold directly only a negligible 
fraction  of the outstanding  debt; most of it is held in the portfolios  of pensions funds, 
insurance companies, and other institutions, and households cannot easily liquidate 
their position in pension funds or borrow  against  their  equity  in insurance  companies. 
These institutional  constraints  can dampen the size of wealth effects on consumption; 
the financial  liberalization  that has occurred  in Ireland  in the late 1980s  could then go 
somewhat toward reconciling  the different outcomes that the capital  gain on public 
debt may have had in the two stabilizations. 96 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
Table 3  CONSUMPTION  FUNCTION ESTIMATESa,b 
Regression:  C(t) =  (1+8)C(t-1)  +  6{A(t) -  (1+8)[A(t-1)  + w(t-1)]} 
+  /[D(t)  -  (1+5)D(t-1)]  + at[Y(t) -  (1+8)Y(t-1)] 
Constraints 
not  rejected 
8  1  f3  below:c  R2 
Denmark (1971-87),  yearly data: 
1.  .050  .025  0.31  .003  75%  .845 
(1.60)  (1.58)  (.86)  (.09) 
2.  .050  .025  .032  75%  .856 
(1.74)  (1.64)  (.90) 
3.  .053  .026  .005  75%  .856 
(1.86)  (1.82)  (.06) 
4.  .063  .032  50%  .869 
(2.27)  (2.28) 
Ireland (1961-87),  yearly data: 
5.  .084  .035  .792  .191  25%  .974 
(1.53)  (1.49)  (.33)  (1.42) 
6.  .108  .056  1.44  50%  .966 
(2.20)  (2.94)  (.82) 
7.  .081  .033  .230  50%  .976 
(1.49)  (1.39)  (1.80) 
8.  .110  .062  75%  .966 
(2.38)  (3.25) 
a C is consumption  of nondurables.  For Denmark it is defined  as total consumption  minus rent, fuel and 
power,  furniture and household  equipment,  and personal  transport equipment  (source: OECD NIA). 
For Ireland it is total consumption  minus  clothing  and footwear,  durable household  goods,  and trans- 
port equipment  (source:  Central  Bank of  Ireland,  as  in  Moore  1987).  Y is disposable  income  of  the 
private sector for Denmark  (source: Central Bank of Denmark) and of the household  sector for Ireland 
(source: Central Bank of Ireland). For both countries,  A is beginning-of-period  wealth,  net of public debt 
D,  of  social  security  wealth,  and  of domestic  assets  held  by foreigners; it includes  houses  at market 
prices and business  capital valued  at replacement  cost. For Denmark, wealth is constructed by subtract- 
ing the entire stock of domestically  held debt D from private sector wealth (we subtract also public debt 
held by banks to net out the portion of deposits  that has public debt as counterpart on the balance sheet 
of banks).  The variable w is labor income,  after-tax for Denmark,  and before-tax for Ireland (source: 
Central Bank of Denmark,  and  OECD NIA  for Ireland). All variables are in real per capita terms (the 
deflator used  is that for nondurables  consumption). 
b The estimation  method  is NLIV, and the estimates  reported in the table are obtained by imposing  the 
nonlinear  constraint  on  the coefficients  of the equation.  The instruments  are a constant,  a time trend 
and one lag of net wealth,  disposable  income,  labor after-tax income,  government  consumption,  govern- 
ment investment,  real money,  investment,  and terms of trade (defined  as the ratio of import prices to 
the deflator of consumption  of nondurables).  Source: OECD NIA. 
c The test refers to the nonlinear  constraint  on  the coefficients  of the equation; the test statistic is the 
quasi-likelihood  ratio of Gallant and Jorgenson  computed  by TSP. The percentage  value shown  in the 
table is the significance  level  below  which  the constraints  are accepted; a higher significance  level is a 
tighter criterion on  the null  hypothesis,  since  it corresponds  to a lower  probability of a type-II error. Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  *  97 
taxes,  while  the consumption  boom  of the late 1980s was helped  by the 
rise in disposable  income  (see Table 2). 
A significant value for the parameter  L  is evidence  of a departure from 
the permanent income hypothesis  that can be interpreted as a symptom of 
liquidity  constraints  or of consumers'  myopia.  Additional  evidence  on 
this point  can be  obtained  by estimating  Euler equations  for aggregate 
consumption  of  nondurables.  As  shown  by  Hall  (1978) and  Hayashi 
(1982), under suitable assumptions,  the proportion of income accruing to 
liquidity-constrained  households  can be measured by the excess sensitiv- 
ity parameter  in the  Euler equation.  Estimates  of this  equation  are re- 
ported  in Table 4.  To correct for the  endogeneity  of current disposable 
income,  the equations  are estimated  by nonlinear instrumental variables 
(NLIV). Since the constraint a = 1 in most cases is not rejected, we also re- 
estimate  the equation  by regressing  the first differences  of consumption 
on those of disposable  income.  In addition, we report the results obtained 
by  using  full  information  maximum  likelihood  (FIML) to estimate  the 
consumption  equation  jointly  with  a predictive  equation  for disposable 
income,  and imposing  the relevant  cross-equations  restrictions.  The re- 
sults confirm that consumption  responds  strongly to anticipated changes 
in current disposable  income  in Ireland, but not Denmark.12 
It is natural to ask which  structural differences between  the two coun- 
tries lie behind  these  results.  The answer  may rest in the very different 
functioning  of credit markets in the two countries.  In Denmark, lending 
to households  plays  a central role in financial intermediation,  and there 
is no  rationing  in  the  market  for credit  to households.  A  survey  con- 
ducted  on behalf  of the Central Bank since  1981 reveals that only 2% of 
households  postpone  purchases  of  consumer  durables  because  they 
have received  or believe  they would  receive a loan refusal (Kjaer 1987).13 
In Ireland, instead,  credit to households  has traditionally been less plenti- 
ful.  Only  in the  late  1980s has  this  started to change,  as the mortgage 
market, formerly the preserve  of building  societies,  has been  opened  to 
competition  by commercial banks. 
A reflection  of this institutional  difference  between  the two countries 
can  be  found  in  the  different  size  of  the  market  for consumer  loans 
documented  in Table 5; in Denmark total lending  to consumers  (the sum 
of consumer  credit and housing  mortgages) is about 3 times as large as in 
Ireland, as a percentage  of total consumption.  To put these  numbers  in 
12. The only regression  for Ireland that does not display excess sensitivity  is that estimated 
with FIML without  imposing  the constraint a =  1. In this case, however,  the other con- 
straints on the model  are rejected by the data at the conventional  5% significance level. 
13. These  data are based  on the "omnibus  survey," conducted  by Danmarks Statistik on a 
sample  of 1,400 wage-  and salary-earning  households,  three times a year. 98 * GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 




a  below:c  R2 
NLIV  estimates:b 
Regression:  C(t) = constant  + aC(t-l)  + ,  [Y(t) -  aY(t-1)] 
Denmark (1966-87)  .975  -.070  75%  .926 
annual data  (13.20)  (-.371) 
Denmark (1971-88)  .983  -.185  25%  .849 
quarterly  data  (21.03)  (-.979) 
Ireland (1960-89)  .808  .516  75%  .975 
yearly data  (3.77)  (5.35) 
Regression:  dC(t) = constant  +  la  dY(t) 
Denmark (1966-87)  .046  .229 
annual data  (.29) 
Denmark (1971-88)  -.039  -.008 
quarterly  data  (-.07) 
Ireland (1962-87)  .351  .443 
yearly data  (2.19) 
FIML  Estimates d 
System:  C(t) = constant.+ aC(t-l)  + ,  [Y(t) -  aY(t-1)];  Y(t) = Z(t)/3 
Denmark (1966-87)  .805  -.541  5% 
yearly data  (4.71)  (-.381) 
Denmark (1971-88)  .876  -1.54  5% 
quarterly data  (10.53)  (-1.08) 
Ireland (1962-87)  .934  .103  2.5% 
yearly data  (15.73)  (.265) 
System:  dC(t) = constant  + ,l dY(t);  dY(t) = dZ(t)f3 
Denmark (1966-87)  -.273  5% 
yearly data  (-.475) 
Denmark (1971-88)  -1.42  1% 
quarterly data  (-1.05) 
Ireland (1962-87)  .407  25% 
yearly data  (2.03) 
a Variables  are defined as in Table 3. In the quarterly  regressions for Denmark, consumption of nondurables is 
defined as total consumption minus clothing and footwear, housing equipment, and personal transport  equip- 
ment (source: Central Bank of Denmark).  b In the regressions on yearly data, the instruments are the first  lag of disposable income, government consump- 
tion, government investment,  net exports, and a time trend. In the equations that employ differences of 
consumption and investment (dC and dY), the instruments are the same variables in differenced form. In the 
regressions on quarterly  data, the instruments are four lags of disposable income and consumption.  c In the NLIV estimates, the test refers to the nonlinear constraint on the coefficients of the equation for C; the 
test statistic is the quasi-likelihood ratio of Gallant and Jorgenson computed by TSP. In the FIML  estimates, we 
test jointly this nonlinear constraint and the cross-equation constraints between the equations for C and Y; in 
this case we use a likelihood ratio test. For the interpretation of these values, see Table 3. In both cases, the 
results reported in the paper refer to the constrained estimates. 
d The set of regressors Z in the predictive equation for Y includes the same variables  used as instruments in the 
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Table  5  CONSUMERS'  LIABILITIES  AS A PERCENTAGE  OF CONSUMERS' 
SPENDING 
Housing  mortgages  Consumers'  credit 
Denmark  Ireland  Denmark  Ireland 
1978-82  94%  29% 
1984  120%  35%  30%  8% 
1986  153%  37%  40%  9% 
1988  184%  42%  37%  11% 
Sources:  Central  Bank  of Denmark,  Monetary  Review,  Tables  22 and 23;  Central  Bank  of Ireland,  Quarterly 
Bulletin,  Table C6; and Department  of the Enviorment,  Annual  Housing  Statistics,  Dublin, various 
issues;  data  for the stock  of housing mortgages  in Denmark  have been provided  directly  by the Central 
Bank  of Denmark. 
perspective,  consider  that in the United  States in 1984 the ratio of con- 
sumer credit to consumption  was 24% and the corresponding  figure for 
housing  mortgages  was  57%-a  total of 81% to be compared with  150% 
in Denmark  and  43% in Ireland.14 Table 5 also  documents  the  tremen- 
dous  rise in consumer  lending  during the Danish  stabilization.  The sec- 
ond Irish stabilization  was also accompanied  by a rise in consumer lend- 
ing, though  to a much  smaller degree. 
3.1.2.  Substitution  between  public  and private  goods  The analysis conducted 
so  far implicitly  assumes  that  public  consumption  is  a pure  waste  of 
resources,  yielding  no utility to consumers-an  assumption  increasingly 
questioned  in recent  research  (see,  e.g.,  Aschauer  1985). If consumers 
value the public provision  of services such as schools,  health care, and the 
like, they will increase private spending  on these items when  they are no 
longer provided  by the government.  Thus, substitution  of private  for public 
consumption  is an additional  direct channel between  fiscal policy and pri- 
vate expenditure.  To the extent that there is such substitution,  the appar- 
ent increase in private consumption  simply reflects measurement  error;  if 
one could measure true consumption,  rather than consumer spending  on 
private sector output,  one would  find it has not increased. 
To provide  a rough  assessment  of the relevance  of this measurement 
error, we compare the increase in private spending  with the reduction of 
14. The relationship  between the size of the market  for consumer  lending and the excess 
sensitivity  of consumption  that we find here parallels the results in Jappelli and Pagano 
(1989) for other seven  OECD countries.  Other evidence  pointing  to the importance  of 
the  market for consumer  lending  in explaining  consumption  behavior  is reported by 
Muellbauer  and  Murphy  (1989), who  analyze  the U.K. credit market liberalization of 
the  1980s,  and  by  Bayoumi  and  Koujianou  (1989),  who  look  at evidence  from  the 
United States, Japan, Canada,  the United Kingdom,  France, and Sweden. 100 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
Table  6  DENMARK:  CHANGES  IN PUBLIC  AND PRIVATE 
CONSUMPTION,  SELECTED  CLASSESa  (at constant  prices, 
percentage  changes per year, 1983-84) 
Changes  in government consumption  Changes  in private  consumption 
Total  -0.2  3.0  Total 
Classes:  Classes: 
Medical  personal services  -0.9  2.5  Physicians  and dentists 
Hospitals  0.3  5.8  Hospital  care 
Education  -0.4  3.4  Education 
Entertainment  and cul-  -2.5  4.8  Entertainment  and cul- 
tural  services  tural  services 
Transportation,  net of spend-  -6.4  3.1  Transportation,  net of spend- 
ing on roads and waterways  ing on personal  transport 
equipment 
All these classes  -0.9  3.4  All these classes 
14.9  Contribution  to change in pri- 
vate consumption 
a  Source:  Danish Statistical Yearbook.  Public spending  in each class is deflated  by the deflator of private 
consumption  in the corresponding  class. 
public spending  on the items for which  substitution  is most likely. Table 
6 shows  that in  1983-84  the  Danish  government  slashed  spending  on 
health care, education,  entertainment,  and provision  of public transpor- 
tation  proportionately  more  than  other  spending.  Danish  households 
increased  private  spending  on  these  services  by  more  than  their total 
consumption  expenditure;  this is particularly evident  in the case of edu- 
cation,  entertainment,  and cultural services.  While this constitutes  evi- 
dence in favor of the substitution  hypothesis,  the empirical magnitude  of 
this factor seems  modest  relative to the total surge in consumption:  the 
contribution of spending  on these  classes of services to the total increase 
in consumption  in those  two years is only 14.9%. 
3.2. THE  CONSUMPTION  PUZZLE  AND THE  ROLE  OF 
EXPECTATIONS  ABOUT  FUTURE  POLICY 
Once  we  control  for changes  in disposable  income  and wealth,  does  a 
large  fraction  of  the  observed  changes  in  consumption  remain  to  be 
explained?  And  do  the  forecast  errors coincide  with  the  years  of  the 
fiscal contractions?  For Denmark,  we  have used  the consumption  func- 
tion  reported  in  line  1 of  Table 3 to  construct  out-of-sample  dynamic 
forecast  errors  for  the  years  1984-87.  The  equation  significantly  un- 
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DYNAMIC  FORECAST  ERRORS 
AS OF 1983  (PERCENT  OF THE 
FORECAST,  YEARLY  DATA) 
1984  1985  1986  1987 
-0.03%  1.90%  3.36%  3.53% 
To appreciate  the  magnitude  of these  numbers,  consider,  for example, 
that the error of 3.36% in 1986 implies a predicted growth rate of real per 
capita consumption  of  1.8%, while  the  actual growth  rate in that year 
was  4.1%.  Using  quarterly  data  we  can  repeat  this  exercise  with  an 
added gain in accuracy; owing  to the larger number of observations,  we 
can  estimate  the  same  regression  with  data  up  to  1983:1, so  that  the 
structure of the model  reflects only  information  available at the time of 
the  forecast.15 For comparability  with  the  forecast  errors obtained  on 
yearly data, we  report averages  of the quarterly errors: 
DYNAMIC  FORECAST  ERRORS  AS OF 1983:1  (PERCENT  OF THE 
FORECAST,  QUARTERLY  DATA) 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
0.04%  0.90%  3.00%  5.80%  6.10%  3.20% 
For Ireland, we  have  replicated  this procedure  only on yearly data. We 
have computed  dynamic  forecasts from a regression  for total consump- 
tion,  rather than  for nondurable  consumption  (data for the latter were 
not available for 1988, the first year of the successful  stabilization).  The 
regressors are the same as in line 5 of Table 3.16  In 1988 the growth rate of 
real per  capita  consumption  was  2.65%, while  that  forecasted  by  our 
regression  is 0.6%. 
Since these  forecasts are computed  by conditioning  on the actual real- 
izations  of the exogenous  variables,  including  wealth,  these  errors can- 
not be attributed to the increase in wealth  due to the fall in interest rates 
and jump in asset prices documented  in Figures 6 and 8. There is indeed 
a consumption  puzzle. 
15. The equation  used  to produce  the forecast uses  the same variables and instruments  as 
that reported  in line  1 of Table 3, but does  not impose  the nonlinear restriction across 
parameters (using quarterly data, these restrictions are rejected at the 10% significance 
level). 
16. Also in this case,  the forecasting  equation was estimated  without  imposing  the restric- 
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Can  the  German  view  of  fiscal  policy  help  resolve  it? As  discussed 
above, this view  turns on the idea that fiscal consolidation  can be read by 
the private sector as a signal that the share of government  consumption 
in GDP is  going  to be  reduced  permanently,  so  that taxes also  will be 
permanently  lower.  This would  lead  households  to revise  upward  the 
estimate  of their human  capital (the discounted  value  of after-tax labor 
income),  and to raise current and planned  consumption.  In the Appen- 
dix  we  show  that  the  effect  of  permanent  spending  cuts  on  private 
consumption  is  positive  whether  consumers  have  infinite  horizons  or 
not (although  the quantitative  significance  of the effect depends  on the 
length  of their horizon,  among  other things). 
For this  view  to  be  consistent  with  the  data,  it  must  be  true  that 
households  perceived  the spending  cuts as permanent,  and the concomi- 
tant  tax increases  as  temporary.  On  the  first point,  we  already  know 
from Figure 3 that,  on the one  hand,  our proxy for permanent  govern- 
ment  consumption  has  declined  after the inception  of the  stabilization 
plans.  On  the  other  hand,  actual taxes  have  started to come  down  in 
Denmark after 1986 and in Ireland after 1987, although  they are still well 
above  the level  of the  1970s (see  Figure 10, which  shows  cyclically cor- 
rected taxes,  net of transfers,  and subsidies).17 
A more  refined  test  of the  expectations  view  turns on  the  following 
point.  Under  rational expectations,  the  error term of the consumption 
function reflects innovations  in permanent disposable income. Now, sup- 
pose  announcements  of spending  cuts are indeed  read as "good news" 
about future disposable  income,  i.e.,  as a signal that the government  is 
about to reduce taxes accordingly further in the future. Then one should 
find  a  negative  correlation  between  consumption  surprises  and  sur- 
prises  in permanent  spending  by the  government  (see  Appendix).  We 
ran a  simple  OLS regression  between  the  in-sample  residuals  of  our 
consumption  function  for  Denmark  (line  1,  Table 3)  and  changes  in 
government  consumption,  as proxy for the surprises in permanent pub- 
lic spending.  The relationship  is negative,  but it is significant (at the 10% 
level)  only when  the regressor is the lagged  change  in public spending, 
not its current value: 
0.197E-3  lagged  change in gov-  consumption  residual  = constant  -  0  -3  - 
(1.705)  ernment consumption 
R2=  0.11  DW=  2.36 
17. Figure 10 displays  cyclically adjusted  taxes, net of interest,  and subsidies,  as a percent- 
age of potential  output.  This cyclical correction should  eliminate most the endogeneity 
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Figure  10 CYCLICALLY  CORRECTED  NET  TAXES 
AS PERCENT.  OF POTENTIAL  GDP 
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This lagged  response  may reflect the institutional  delay in the release of 
revised  figures  for  government  spending,  so  that  it  is  reasonable  to 
suppose  people  update their estimate of permanent spending  with a lag. 
In Ireland,  instead,  no  significant  correlation is found  between  con- 
sumption  residuals  and changes  in government  spending.  This may be 
due to the presence  of liquidity constraints,  which we have documented 
in the previous  section; the positive  impact on consumption  of a fall in 
permanent  taxes  can be dampened  if consumers  are unable  to borrow 
freely against their human  capital or their equity 
3.3. SUMMING  UP 
It may be useful  at this point  to summarize  our findings  about the con- 
sumption  puzzle.  For Denmark, there is considerable evidence in favor of 
the view that the consumption  boom of 1984-86 cannot be fully explained 
by the fall in interest  rates and the implied  wealth  effects,  and that the 
unexplained  component  of the boom is related to cuts in public spending. 
This is consistent with the view that cuts in current government consump- 
tion were  seen  as a signal of lower taxes further in the future. 
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primarily by disposable  income-probably  a reflection of the importance 
of liquidity  constraints  in the Irish economy.  This may explain the con- 
tractionary effects  of the  first Irish stabilization,  when  the reduction  in 
disposable  income  translated  directly into a corresponding  drop in con- 
sumption.  What then explains  the consumption  boom that accompanied 
the  second  Irish  stabilization?  Probably a combination  of  two  factors: 
first, the axe of the new  government  fell more heavily  on public spend- 
ing than on households'  disposable  income,  unlike a few years before, 
and the increase  in tax revenue  was  obtained  while  reducing  marginal 
tax rates; second,  the liberalization of the Irish credit markets in the late 
1980s may have increased the ability of households  to borrow in anticipa- 
tion of higher  future incomes.  It is tempting  to relate the large forecast 
error of the Irish consumption  function in 1988 with these factors, and to 
conclude  that the German view  may have  something  to say also for the 
second  Irish stabilization. 
4. Real interest  rates  and investment 
In Section 3 we have argued that part of the expansionary  effects associ- 
ated with the fiscal stabilization in our two "test countries" may actually 
stem from the fall in real interest  rates associated  with the concomitant 
monetary  and exchange  rate policies.  Obviously,  a fall in the long-term 
real rate of  interest  stimulates  investment.  Nevertheless,  this  appears 
not to be enough  to explain  the investment  boom in Denmark in 1985- 
86; when  we  estimate  a simple  reduced  form equation  for business  in- 
vestment,  which  includes  one  lag of investment  and of the real cost of 
capital,  and  two  lags  of  real GDP, we  find  that  its  dynamic  forecasts 
significantly  underpredict  investment  in these years:'8 
I(t) = constant  +  .41 I(t-l)  +  .37 Y(t-1)  -  .27 T(t-2)  -  .10 UC(t-1) 
(1.85)  (2.61)  (2.13)  (1.81) 
Forecast errors as of 1983 (percentage  of the forecast): 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
-0.83%  3.2%  10.0%  -1.1%  3.5% 
18. Investment,  I, is defined as gross business investment;  Y is real GDP (Source:  OECD, 
National  Income Accounts). The user cost of capital  is defined as UC = [(l+i)*(1-t)]/ 
(1- T')  where i is the Danish bank loan rate, t is the corporation  tax rate, and T  is 
expected inflation over a five-year horizon, built using the same methodology de- 
scribed  in footnote 2. The regression  is estimated  on yearly  data  from  1971  to 1988,  and 
has a corrected  R2  of .732, and a Durbin-Watson  value of 2.33. Very  similar  results  were 
obtained using data from 1961, but omitting the user cost of capital,  which was not 
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This evidence  is consistent  with  two  alternative explanations.  As in the 
case  of  consumption,  investment  decisions  may  reflect an increase  in 
profitability associated with the anticipated cut in future taxes. An alterna- 
tive explanation  is suggested  by the observation  that the decision  to peg 
the exchange  rate and remove  capital controls was accompanied  by mas- 
sive capital inflows; foreign borrowing by private enterprises,  in 1984 and 
1985, accounted  for 42% and 51% respectively  of gross business  invest- 
ment expenditure.19 The reason is probably that although,  as we  know, 
nominal interest rates fell considerably at the announcement  of the stabili- 
zation,  they  remained  higher  than  German rates.  In the  presence  of a 
credibly fixed exchange rate, borrowing abroad became a very convenient 
proposition: domestic  firms suddenly  faced lower real rates-equal  to the 
German nominal rate minus the domestic inflation rate. In this context, the 
removal  of  controls  on  capital  inflows  by  the  Danish  authorities  was 
equivalent  to a positive  demand  shock. 
5. What  have  we learned? 
We started this paper by asking whether  the European exercise in fiscal 
rectitude in the 1980s sheds  any light on two contending  views  about the 
effects  of  a fiscal  contraction:  the  Keynesian  view,  that focuses  on  its 
direct effects  on aggregate  demand,  and the  "expectations" view-also 
known  in Europe as the German view-that  stresses  the role of current 
changes  in taxes  or government  spending  as signals  of possible  future 
changes.  We have learned that there are cases in which the German view 
has a serious claim to empirical relevance.  The Danish experience  shows 
that cuts  in  government  spending  can be associated  with  increases  in 
consumption  even  after controlling  for wealth  and income,  and even  in 
the  presence  of a substantial  increase  in  current taxes.  The Irish case, 
however,  highlights  the potential  importance  of liquidity constraints for 
the operation of this mechanism.  When current disposable  income effec- 
tively constrains consumption,  Keynesian  textbook propositions  seem to 
recover  their  predictive  power,  as  witnessed  by  the  7% drop  in  real 
consumption  in 1982 during the first Irish stabilization. 
We have  also found  that part of the expansionary  effects of the fiscal 
contractions analyzed  here must be attributed to the concomitant mone- 
tary disinflation,  which in these countries operated via the switch to fixed 
exchange rates with a low-inflation  currency (the German mark), and the 
liberalization of capital flows.  This produced a sharp fall of nominal inter- 
est rates; in the presence  of inflation  inertia, the latter translated into a 
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corresponding  drop  of real rates and a rise in aggregate  demand.  This 
expansionary  effect,  however,  crucially hinged  on the credibility of the 
fixed parity chosen  by the monetary  authorities.  It is remarkable that in 
both our cases  of "expansionary  contractions" the shift in fiscal and ex- 
change  rate policy was  preceded  by a sizable devaluation. 
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APPENDIX 
1. The  response  of  private  consumption  to  fiscal  and 
monetary  policy 
Consider the consumption  function  proposed  by Blanchard (1985): 
C(t) =  (p+O) [H(t) + K(t) +  D(t)],  (1) 
where 1/p is the horizon  index (p -> 0 being the Ricardian case of infinite 
horizon  consumers),  H(t) is human  capital, K(t) is private wealth  net of 
government  debt,  and  D(t)  is  the  market  value  of  government  debt, 
measured  in units  of consumption  goods.  Human  capital is the present 
discounted  value  of aftertax labor income,  discounted  at the subjective 
rate of the representative  household,  p+ 0: 
H(t)=  f  Y(s)e-(r+p)(s- ds -  T(s)e-r+p)(s-ds  (2) 
where  the real interest  rate r is assumed  to be constant. 
To highlight  the  role of a long  maturity of the  debt,  we  assume  that 
public debt consists  of B consols,  each paying  1 dollar per period.  Using 
the government  budget  constraint,  the real value  of debt,  i.e.,  the dis- 108 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
counted  value  of  the  flow  of  coupons  on  the  B consols  (measured  in 
units of consumption),  equals the discounted  value of future real budget 
surpluses: 
D(t) =  e-r(s-)(Be--t))ds=  [T(s)-G(s)]e-r(s-)ds.  (3) 
Using  these  three equations,  we  can analyze  the response  of consump- 
tion to changes  in current taxes T(t), the inflation rate Tr,  the real interest 
rate r, and permanent  spending  Gp(t),  defined as the annuity value of the 
future discounted  flow  of real government  spending: 
GP(t)  = r  G(s)e-r(s-t)ds.  (4) 
As shown  by Blanchard (1985), if the horizon  of consumers  is finite (p > 
0) consumption  falls when,  for given  GP(t),  the government  raises taxes 
temporarily, offsetting  such an increase by a tax cut at some  future date 
t+4T,: 
8C(t) =  -  (p+O) (1-e-Pr)  <  0.  (5) 
8T(t) 
In both equations  (5) and (6) the effect on consumption  is an increasing 
function  of p: the shorter the horizon  of consumers,  the larger the fall in 
consumption  in  response  to  higher  transitory  taxes  or inflation.  With 
incomplete  tax discounting  and long-term  nominal  debt,  an increase in 
inflation also reduces  consumption,  since higher inflation decreases  the 
market  value  of  nominal  debt  D(t)  by  more  than  it increases  human 
capital H(t). Assuming  that the increase in rr is permanent  and that the 
corresponding  reduction  in  taxes  will  be  concentrated  at  some  future 
date t+  i,  the effect is: 
8C(t)  B 
-=  (p+O)  (1-e-  ) <  0.  (6) 
ST  '  (r+ 7T)2 
The  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  real interest  rate r, instead,  is always 
negative,  whether  the horizon  of consumers  is infinite (p = O)  or not. In 
the presence  of finite horizons,  however,  the negative  effect of a rise in r 
also  works  through  the  capital loss  on  the  market value  of long-term 
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capital (due  to the fall in future taxes).  Assuming  that real government 
spending  and real taxes are constant  in levels  G and T respectively,  and 
that pretax labor and capital income  are also fixed at a level Y, the effect 
of a permanent  rise in the real rate of interest is: 
8C(t)  Y-G  Tp (2r+p)  =-  (p+6)  -  (P+6  )  <0,  (7) 
8r  (r+p)2  r2  (r+p)2 
where the term corresponding  to the capital loss on long-term debt is the 
second  one,  and vanishes  for p = 0. 
Finally, consider  the effect of a change in current spending  G(t). If this 
is perceived  as temporary,  i.e.,  permanent  spending  GP(t)  remains  un- 
changed,  it can be shown  that consumption  will not change,  irrespective 
of the value of p. This is because a temporary change in current spending 
does  not  affect  the  path  of  taxes.  If, however,  households  regard the 
change  in current spending  as a signal of a change in permanent  spend- 
ing,  their consumption  will be affected.  Suppose,  for instance,  that per- 
manent  spending  increases  and  in  each  future  period  s taxes  T(s) are 
going  to be  changed  by an amount  equal  to the  change  in permanent 
spending  Gp(t).  Then current consumption  C(t)falls: 
8C(t)  p+  = -  < 0.  (8) 
8GP(t)  r+p 
Vice versa,  a cut in permanent  spending  has an expansionary  effect on 
current consumption.  The effect of consumers'  horizon  (l/p) is ambigu- 
ous: on the one  hand,  a long  horizon  implies  that the consumer  will be 
around  longer  to  enjoy  lower  taxes; on  the  other  hand,  she  will  have 
to  spread  the  increase  in  her  permanent  income  over  a  longer  ex- 
pected  lifetime.  If  the  individual  consumption  path  is  flat  (0  =  r), 
these  two  effects  cancel  out,  and  the  increase  in consumption  exactly 
matches  the  fall in  permanent  spending.  A longer  horizon  makes  the 
spending  cut  more  expansionary  if individual  consumption  is  declin- 
ing  over  time  (0  >  r),  and  less  expansionary  if  it  is  increasing  over 
time  (0  <  r).  If  0  >  r,  an  increase  in  permanent  disposable  income 
translates  more  into  higher  wealth  accumulation  than  higher  current 
consumption;  if 0 <  r, the reverse happens. 
2. Derivation  of the  equation  estimated  in Table  3 
The  equation  is  derived  along  the  lines  of  Hayashi  (1982). Aggregate 
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C(t) =  0 [A(t) + H(t)] + /  D(t) + -  Y(t) +  u(t)  (9) 
where  A(t) is real and financial wealth  net of public debt, H(t) is human 
capital, gross  of taxes,  that is,  the P.V.D. of pre-tax labor income,  D(t) is 
public debt,  Y(t) is personal  disposable  income,  and u(t) is a white  noise 
disturbance  that  captures  transitory  consumption  shocks  arising  from 
preference  shifts  and  measurement  errors. The parameter f3 on  public 
debt  can be  smaller  than  the  parameter  0 on  other forms  of wealth  to 
reflect the degree  of tax discounting  by the private sector (8/ =  0 in the 
Ricardian case). The parameter ,  measures  the share of income accruing 
to consumers  who  do  not  behave  according  to the  permanent  income 
hypothesis,  due to liquidity constraints  or myopia,  and simply consume 
all their disposable  income. 
The law of motion  of human  capital is: 
H(t) =  (1+5)  [H(t-l)  -  w(t-l)]  + e(t)  (10) 
where  8 is the discount  rate that consumers  apply to their future after-tax 
labor income  w(t), and e(t) is the revision of the value of human capital- 
a white  noise  error under  rational expectations.  An  unexpected  fall in 
permanent  taxes at time t leads  to a revision  of the PDV of future after- 
tax earnings  H(t) and thus to a positive  realization of e(t). 
Equation  (10) can be  used  in  (9) to  substitute  out  the  unobservable 
H(t), obtaining  the equation  estimated  in Table 3: 
C(t) =  (1+5)C(t-1)  +  6{A(t) -  (1+6)[A(t-1)  + w(t-1)]} 
+  3[D(t) -  (l+8)D(t-1)]  + /[Y(t)  -  (l+8)Y(t-1)]  + v(t).  (11) 
The  error term  v(t)  =  u(t)  -  (l+8)u(t-1)  +  Oe(t)  reflects  current and 
lagged  shocks  to transitory consumption,  u(t), and revisions  of human 
capital  and  permanent  taxes,  e(t).  Due  to  the  nonlinear  restrictions 
among the coefficients  and to the correlation between  A(t), Y(t), and v(t), 
the equation  must be estimated  with NLIV, using  variables in the infor- 
mation set of consumers  at time t-1  as instruments.  The MA(1) compo- 
nent involving  u(t) can lead to serial correlation in the error term, which 
in  turn  can  make  these  instruments  endogenous  (see  Hayashi  1982); 
however,  in our estimates  this problem can be neglected,  since the sam- 
ple  autocorrelation  of  the  residuals  is  not  significantly  different  from 
zero. 
To the  extent  that  a reduction  in  current  spending  is  perceived  by 
households  as permanent,  it will translate into an unexpected  increase in 
their  human  capital,  H(t),  and  thus  into  a positive  e(t). We therefore Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  ?  111 
expect  changes  in spending,  if permanent,  to correlate negatively  with 
the estimated  consumption  residual v(t) via its component  e(t). 
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Europe in the 1980s will have  provided  more than its share of challeng- 
ing  macroeconomic  facts.  The paper by Giavazzi  and Pagano adds  an- 
other one  to the  list.  In a number  of countries,  most  notably  Denmark 
and Ireland,  fiscal contraction  on a scale that would  make U.S.  policy- 
makers faint was  associated  with  a strong output performance-an  out- 
come  that surprised  even  the  governments  that had  implemented  the 
consolidation. 
Giavazzi and Pagano do a superb job of documenting  the facts. They 
also do a convincing  job of showing  that, while  fiscal consolidation  was 
part of a package and other factors were at work, fiscal policy surely did 
not work in the way  suggested  by the Keynesian  textbook.  Sometimes, 
the German view  of the effects of fiscal policy appears to be right, and a 
decrease in spending  or an increase in taxes indeed  increases consump- 
tion,  demand  and  output.  The questions  are that of when  and how.  I 
shall use  my comments  to sketch a simple model  that complements  the 
analysis  of Giavazzi  and Pagano and that I have found  helpful  to think 
about these  issues. 
I shall  focus  on  the  questions  of  whether  and  when  a  permanent 
increase  in taxes may, given  government  spending,  increase  consump- 
tion.  Closely  related questions,  which  would  fit better the experience  of 
Ireland in the late 1970s are whether  and when  a large decrease in public 
spending  can  increase  aggregate  demand.  It will  be  obvious  that  the 
answers  to the first question  apply equally well to the second. 
When  a government  consolidates  its budget  position  through  an in- 
crease  in  taxes,  it  affects  expectations  and  thus  consumption  in  two 
ways.  First, the intertemporal  redistribution  of taxes from the future to 
the present  is likely to increase  the tax burden of current taxpayers and 
reduce  their consumption.  This effect  is  the  conventional  one,  and  its 
strength  depends  on how  much  the economy  departs from the bench- 
mark of Ricardian equivalence.  But, second,  by taking measures  today, 
the government  eliminates  the need for larger, maybe much more disrup- 
tive adjustments  in the future and this may in turn increase  consump- 
tion. These  are the two  effects I want to model; in doing  so I make four 
assumptions. 
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First, higher taxes decrease  output.  If t is the tax rate, I assume  there is 
a critical value  of t, call it T, such  that if t exceeds  T, output  is lower by 
some  amount  or 
for t<T,  y = y, and for t>T,  y = y-or. 
This is a crude formalization for a complex array of effects. The higher the 
tax rate required by a fiscal consolidation,  the larger the permanent distor- 
tions it will imply, but also the larger the transitory disruptions  coming 
from the adjustment  itself. What is important for the results below is that 
the marginal resource cost of taxation increases  with the tax rate. 
Second,  the  longer  the  government  waits  to consolidate;  the higher 
the required tax increase  when  it does.  This is not,  strictly speaking,  an 
assumption  so much as a straightforward implication of the government 
dynamic budget  constraint,  which  I write as: 
db/ds = rb -  ty, 
where b is government  debt, r is the interest rate, and s denotes  time (as t 
is already used  for the tax rate). For notational  simplicity, I take govern- 
ment spending  to be equal to zero. 
I assume  that before consolidation,  the government  is running a defi- 
cit, so that b is increasing.  I take consolidation  to mean an increase in taxes 
such that debt is stabilized  at a constant value forever. (Given the struc- 
ture of the model,  the optimal consolidation  would  be to increase taxes 
even  more,  allowing  for a reduction  of debt and a lower-tax rate later. I 
ignore  that possibility).  The tax rate, t*, implied  by the consolidation  is 
thus given  by: 
t*(b) =  rb/y. 
so that given  y, t* increases  with b and thus increases with time. 
Together, these  two  assumptions  imply  that there is a critical level  of 
debt,  B, such  that,  once  it is reached,  consolidation  requires a tax rate 
which  in turn implies  a low level of output,  y-oa.  (There is also a Laffer- 
like interval of values  for debt for which  consolidation  is associated  with 
two tax rates-one  low  and associated  with high output,  the other high 
and associated  with  low  output.  It is reasonable  to assume  the govern- 
ment chooses  the low  tax rate when  it has the choice).  This critical level 
of debt is given  by: 
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At any point in time-say  time zero-given  the current tax rate, to, and 
the current level  of debt,  b0, one  can compute  the time,  call it v, that it 
would  take for debt to reach its critical value B, were no consolidation  to 
take place between  now  and then.  v is given by: 
v  =  (llr)ln((T-  to)l(t*(bo)- to)); t*(bo) =  rbdy. 
Thus, how  close the economy  is to the brink-more  formally, how much 
time is left before  consolidation  requires a tax rate that leads  to a large 
output  loss-depends  on  three  sets  of  variables.  The  lower  the  gap 
between  the  critical and  current tax rates,  (T-to),  the  smaller is v. The 
larger the  gap  between  the  tax rate required for consolidation  and  the 
current tax rate,  (t*(bo)-to), the  smaller is v. Finally, a higher  value  of r 
decreases v through two channels,  by increasing the rate of debt accumu- 
lation,  and  increasing  the  size  of  the  increase  in  the  tax rate required 
when  consolidation  takes place. 
It is clear how  consolidation  may then  improve  perceptions  of future 
output,  and through  them,  consumption.  Consolidation,  if it takes place 
before  B has  been  reached,  removes  the  danger  of low  output  and  is 
therefore good news.  This formalization focuses  on the effects of consoli- 
dation on the expected  level of output; there is another, probably equally 
important  implication  of consolidation  that this formalization  does  not 
capture-the  effect  of consolidation  on uncertainty.  Consolidation  may 
be associated,  at least after a while,  with a substantial decrease in uncer- 
tainty, leading  to a decrease  in precautionary  savings,  to a decrease  in 
the option  value  of waiting  by consumers  to buy durables and by firms 
to take investment  decisions.  The large positive  residuals  in the invest- 
ment equation  for Denmark found  by Giavazzi and Pagano are strongly 
suggestive  of  the  presence  of  such  effects.  While  the  level  and  uncer- 
tainty  effects  work  in  the  same  direction,  it  would  be  interesting  to 
introduce  the uncertainty  effect formally. But it is hard work and I shall 
not do so here. 
How  much  good  news  the consolidation  actually is depends  on how 
unexpected  it is; this motivates  the third assumption,  that consolidation 
is  a  stochastic  event,  with  constant  instantaneous  probability  8.  The 
parameter  8 captures  how  people  perceived  the resolve  of the  govern- 
ment before consolidation  occurs. If 8 is low, consolidation  comes largely 
as a surprise,  and is therefore major news.  But if 8 is high,  consolidation 
is widely  expected,  and  thus  not  much  of a surprise  when  it actually 
happens. 
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on the government  in this context.  Fiscal policy  should  be such that, at 
any  point,  the  expected  value  of  debt  does  not  grow  asymptotically 
faster than the interest rate. This in turn implies here that the probability 
of consolidation  must  be  sufficiently  high,  or more  precisely  that 8 be 
greater than r. If 8 were  less  than r, then although  consolidation  would 
eventually  take  place  with  probability  equal  to  one  in  the  limit,  the 
expected  value of debt would  grow faster than the interest rate, an issue 
reminiscent  of  stochastic  bubbles.  Assuming  8 greater than r excludes 
this possibility. 
Finally, one last but crucial assumption  is needed  regarding the specifi- 
cation of how consumers  react to expectations  of future output and taxes, 
the specification  of the consumption  function.  As in all issues  relating to 
intertemporal  reallocations  of taxes, what matters most is the horizon of 
consumers.  For those  purposes,  the  model  of  aggregate  consumption 
based  on  consumers  with  constant  probability of death-which  I have 
developed  elsewhere  and is used  by Giavazzi and Pagano-does  the job 
nicely,  and  I shall  rely  on  it.  This  motivates  the  last  assumption  that 
consumers  are  optimizing  and  forward  looking,  with  subjective  dis- 
count  rate 0, and  myopia  coefficient  (or probability of death) p. p is an 
index  of how  non-Ricardian  the  economy  is; if p=O, Ricardian equiva- 
lence  holds.  If p is  positive,  intertemporal  reallocations  of  taxes  affect 
consumption.  These  assumptions  imply  the  following  aggregate  con- 
sumption  function: 
C =  (p+  )[b +  (other wealth)  +  E(f y(l-t)exp(-(r+p)s)ds)]. 
The  marginal  propensity  to  consume  out  of  wealth  is  equal  to  (p+O). 
Wealth is  equal  to  the  sum  of  nonhuman  wealth  and  human  wealth. 
Nonhuman  wealth  includes  government  debt and other assets.  Human 
wealth is the expected  present discounted  value of after tax income,  with 
the  discount  rate  equal  to  r+p.  I make  no  distinction  between  labor 
income  and total income;  it would  be easy to introduce it. The discount 
rate depends  on the degree  of myopia,  p. The need  to have an expecta- 
tion operator comes  from the uncertainty about the sequence  of after-tax 
income introduced  by the uncertainty about the timing of consolidation. 
It is now  a simple  matter of algebra to derive the effects on consump- 
tion  of a consolidation,  say, at time  zero.  Two effects  are in general  at 
work.  The  first  is  that  consolidation  may  save  the  economy  from 
catastrophies  in the  future.  It is present  if two  conditions  are met.  The 
output  cost  of high  taxation,  or, is positive,  and consolidation  happens 
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tax rate.  The  second  effect  is  the  traditional  one,  as  consolidation  in- 
creases current taxes, decreasing  consumption.  It will be present so long 
as consumers  are not Ricardian. I consider  the two effects in turn. 
The first effect (and the only one if consumers  are Ricardian, in which 
case p=0  in the expressions  below)  is given by: 
Ac =  (p+ 0)[ -change  in expected  present  value of output] 
=  (p+ O)[  exp(- 8s)8((a/r)exp(- (r+p)s)ds] 
=  (p+  )[ (acr)(8/(8+r+p))exp(-(8+r+p)  v)] 
where  v =  (l/r)ln((T- to)/(t*(bo)  - t));  t*(bo)=  rb/y. 
Before consolidation  actually  occurs,  there  is  a risk that consolidation 
may  come  so  late  as  to  imply  reduced  output.  Current consolidation 
eliminates  this  danger.  The  gain  from  consolidation  is  thus  equal  to 
minus  the expected  present  value  of output  losses  that people  expected 
preconsolidation. 
The term in brackets in the second  expression  for Ac gives the present 
value  of the  output  loss  preconsolidation.  exp  (-8s)8  is the probability 
that consolidation  takes place at time s.  (a/r)exp(-(r+p)s)  is the present 
value  at time zero of the output  loss  if consolidation  takes place at time 
s>v,  requiring  a high  tax rate and  leading  to low  output.  (p+O) is the 
marginal propensity  to consume  out of wealth. 
This expression  for the output effect on consumption  allows for charac- 
terization of the role of the various parameters.  Obviously  the larger the 
output loss,  or,  the larger the gain from consolidation.  The smaller v, the 
closer the  economy  is to the brink, the larger the gain from consolida- 
tion. Thus, the higher bo  or the higher to, the larger the gain from consoli- 
dation.  The effects  of 8 are ambiguous:  on the one hand,  a low  8 means 
consolidation  was  not widely  expected  and comes  largely as a surprise; 
on  the  other  hand  a low  8 also  implies  that people  did not  expect  the 
consolidation  and thus the output  loss to happen  anytime  soon. 
The  second  effect,  which  is  present  only  if consumers  are myopic, 
comes from the front-loading  of taxes that comes with the consolidation. 
While  the  present  value  of  taxes  remains  the  same,  consolidation  in- 
creases current taxes and this,  if consumers  are myopic,  decreases  con- 
sumption.  This effect is given  by: 
Ac =  (p+ 0)[-change  in the expected  present  value of taxes] 
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This expression  for the tax effect on consumption  also shows  the role of 
the various parameters of the model.  The decrease in consumption  is an 
increasing  function  of p, the degree  of myopia.  If p=0,  then  Ac=0.  The 
current  increase  in  taxes  is  then  exactly  offset  in  the  people's  budget 
constraint by the decrease  in expected  future taxes. If p is positive,  front- 
loading  of taxes decreases  consumption,  and the effect is increasing in p. 
The  decrease  in  consumption  is  an  increasing  function  of  rbo-yt,  the 
increase  in  taxes  required  by  the  consolidation.  The  decrease  in  con- 
sumption  is a decreasing  function  of 8. The lower  8, the further in the 
future  consumers  expect  the  tax increase  to happen,  the larger the in- 
crease in the tax burden  implied  by the consolidation. 
Having  sketched  the model,  let me now  return to the real world  and 
use  it. When  would  we  expect  a fiscal consolidation  to increase  rather 
than decrease  consumption?  When the first effect dominates  the second 
one.  This, the model  suggests,  is more likely under two conditions. 
The  first condition  is  when  people  exhibit  little'myopia,  leading  to 
small  effects  of  intertemporal  tax  reallocation,  so  that  output  effects 
dominate.  If one  sticks  to  the  interpretation  of p as the  probability  of 
death,  this  does  not  seem  a promising  way  of  explaining  differences 
across countries.  But under a more generous  interpretation of p as reflect- 
ing  in  particular the  development  of  credit markets  and  the  ability to 
borrow against  future income,  this is definitely  more promising.  In that 
regard,  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  provide  interesting  evidence  about  the 
importance  of consumer  credit in Denmark.  One  would  expect  the re- 
sponse  of consumers  to be distinctly  less  Ricardian in countries  where 
the credit system  is much less developed. 
(2) The second  condition  is when  the economy  is closer to the brink, 
which in turn depends  on the distance between  the critical tax rate and the 
current tax rate as well  as the level  of debt. In this respect,  both Ireland 
and Denmark were  indeed  strong candidates  for a strong output  effect. 
The marginal tax rate (total, for average production  worker) in Denmark 
in 1983 was equal to 71.2%, compared, for example, to 48.6% in the United 
States,  and  gross  debt was  equal  to 65% of GNP. In Ireland, the corre- 
sponding  number for the tax rate in 1983 was 70.2% and, in 1987, the year 
of the second  fiscal consolidation,  the debt to GNP ratio stood  at 135%. 
Under those conditions,  it would  indeed  have been reasonable for people 
to assume  that if consolidation  was not coming soon,  it later would  have 
to be achieved  at punitive  tax rates and substantial disruptions,  and thus 
for the first effect  to be quite  strong.  One  would  not,  however,  expect 
effects  of  the  same  strength  for milder,  run-of-the-mill  consolidations, 
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Comment 
ALLAN  DRAZEN 
Francesco Giavazzi  and Marco Pagano present  two cases where  a sharp 
fiscal  contraction  meant  to  stabilize  an  inflationary  economy  led  not 
simply  to a significant  increase in private consumption  and investment, 
but to an expansion  rather than a contraction of output.  There are oth- 
ers, such as the economic  expansion  in Israel in 1986-1987 in wake of the 
July 1985 stabilization.  What  mechanisms  can  explain  this  "perverse" 
effect  of  fiscal  contractions  on  output?  Though  contradictory  to  basic 
textbook  aggregate  demand  models  of economic  activity, it has  gained 
many adherents  in Europe,  coming  to be known  as the "German view" 
of the effect of fiscal policy. 
The possible  explanations  can be put into two basic categories: those 
which  rely primarily  on  changes  in  current variables,  such  as interest 
rates  or wealth  (which  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  term  direct effects);  and 
those which  rely primarily on expectations  of changes  in variables in the 
future-specifically,  changes  in the current deficit induce expectations  of 
future  changes  in  fiscal  policy.  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  consider  various 
direct mechanisms  empirically to see how much of the "perverse" effects 
that can explain.  They reject the direct mechanisms,  I think correctly, as 
providing  a full explanation,  suggesting  the need  to concentrate on pol- 
icy expectations  effects. 
In these  comments  I want to do three things.  First, I want to highlight 
what  struck me as "regularities" in these  episodes,  with  an eye  toward 
differentiating  possible  explanations.  Second,  I will  review  their  evi- 
dence  on  the  explanatory  power  of the  direct,  current variable effects, 
adding further evidence  that rejects these as the full explanation.  Finally, 
I want  to look at the policy  expectations  view  more closely  and suggest 
what  type  of model  might  explain  some  of the  regularities  from these 
episodes.  Basically, I want  to  formalize  slightly  the  notion  of  process 
switching,  which  I think is inherent  in the policy expectations  view. 
1. What  Is to Be  Explained? 
Table 1 and Figure 2 in the paper consider  the prevalence  of expansion- 
ary effects  of fiscal policy. Taking these  data, the episodic  description  of 
the  Danish  and  Irish cases,  as well  as other episodes,  two  regularities 
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are considering  an increase  in taxes  or a cut in government  spending. 
The first has the standard depressing  effect on consumption  and output; 
only the second  gives  the perverse  effect. The two Irish episodes  tell the 
same story. The first stabilization  attempt in which  the government  defi- 
cit was  cut via higher  taxes  was  contractionary; the  second,  where  the 
deficit  was  cut  via  cuts  in  government  consumption  and  investment 
spending  was  highly  expansionary. 
Considering  the  effect  on  consumption  and  output  of  government 
spending  cuts, the results are mixed.  Though the signs of the coefficients 
in Table 1 are consistent  with a perverse effect across countries,  the effect 
is  statistically  significant  in  only  a  few  cases.  Figure  2  tells  a  similar 
story-the  evidence  in  favor  of  an  expansionary  effect  of government 
spending  cuts is quite mixed.  Denmark and Ireland would  appear to be 
outliers.  My  reading  of  the  episodes  here,  and  of  the  case  of  Israel, 
which  experienced  a  consumption  and  investment  boom  in  1986-87 
following  a sharp fiscal contraction in 1985, is that there may be a nonlin- 
earity. Perverse effects may come from very large fiscal contractions, but 
are less  likely  to result  from  small  ones.  A model  should  explain  why 
there may be a difference,  and,  I will  argue below,  a model  of process 
switching  may do just that. Moreover, the mixed evidence  and the possi- 
ble nonlinearity  suggests  that the  German view  that fiscal contractions 
are in general expansionary  is on weak footing. 
2. Explanations  Based  on Current  Variables 
Giavazzi  and Pagano  first consider  explanations  based  on the effects  of 
changes  in  current  variables  and  argue  that these  don't  provide  a full 
explanation.  To begin  with,  there is the argument  that decreases  in real 
interest rates induce  capital gains on public debt to finitely lived consum- 
ers,  this  wealth  effect  raising  consumption.  As  Giavazzi  and  Pagano 
point  out,  this  explanation  has  problems.  One  problem  is  that  debt 
enters  insignificantly  in  the  consumption  function  for both  countries; 
another is that other episodes  suggest  this effect is neither sufficient nor 
necessary  for a consumption  boom.  There was also a fall in interest rates 
and  increase  in wealth  in the  first Irish episode,  with  no  consumption 
boom,  while  the Israeli boom  occurred in a situation where  real interest 
rates  rose sharply.  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  further  similarly  demonstrate 
that lower  interest  rates  are not  sufficient  to  explain  the  observed  in- 
creases in private investment  spending. 
A second line of explanation  concerns substitution of private consump- 
tion  for  government  consumption.  Here  too  the  magnitudes  are  too 
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There are two  other  possibilities  effects  that I mention  because  they 
played  an  important  role  in  the  Israeli case.  The first is  relative  price 
effects  from a temporarily  overvalued  real exchange  rate. Immediately 
following  the stabilization of July 1985, there was a sharp fall in consump- 
tion.  Starting in  1986, however,  expenditures  on  durable consumption 
and  investment  goods,  which  are  largely  imported,  jumped  sharply 
(Razin and Sadka 1990). This increase largely explains  the consumption 
boom.  What accounted  for this  sharp increase  in durable expenditure? 
The  1985 stabilization  was  accompanied  by  a  sharp  devaluation,  fol- 
lowed  by a period  of fixed  exchange  rates. During  the period  in which 
the  nominal  exchange  rate was  fixed,  inflation  continued,  implying  a 
real appreciation and an overvalued  exchange  rate. The real appreciation 
engendered  expectations  of a devaluation,  leading  people  to move  up 
their  purchases  of  imported  durables.  Hence,  the  consumption  boom 
was related to the timing of exchange  rate movements. 
The data  suggest  a similar pattern  for the  second  Irish stabilization. 
There is  a sharp  devaluation  and  an improvement  in exports  in  1987. 
Consumption  really rises somewhat  later, in 1988-89.  The figures in the 
paper  are for nondurable  consumption.  It would  be interesting  to  see 
data on  consumption  of  durables  and  on  real exchange  rates to see  if 
there was a timing effect in the Irish case. 
The other  affect seen  in Israel is a sharp increase in productivity  and 
reallocation  of resources  out of the financial sector as inflation dropped 
sharply. Were such effects present  in Denmark or Ireland? 
In short,  theories  that are based  on  direct effects  of changes  in cur- 
rent variables  may  contribute  to an understanding  of the expansionary 
effects  of fiscal contractions,  but do not in themselves  give an adequate 
explanation. 
3. The  Policy  Expectations  View 
A more promising  line of argument  is that the effects of current macro- 
economic  policy  depend  on what  expectations  of future policy  they  in- 
duce.  "Perverse" effects  of policy,  whereby  government  spending  cuts 
can be  expansionary  are due  not  to  some  exotic  theory,  but  to a very 
orthodox  theory  combined  with  the  view  that fiscal contraction  today 
will  signal,  enable,  or force an expansionary  change  in fiscal policy  to- 
morrow. Applied  to inflation this is the Sargent and Wallace "Unpleasant 
Monetarist Arithmetic"  (1981) argument  that a cut in the rate of growth 
of the  money  supply  today  implies  faster growth  of government  debt 
and higher  debt  service  tomorrow,  implying  a need  to raise the rate of 
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Giavazzi and Pagano endorse  this view, arguing that the consumption 
booms  in the  Danish  and  second  Irish case reflect the expectation  that 
future  taxes  and  government  spending  will  be  cut.  How  then  do  we 
explain the absence  of a boom in the first Irish stabilization? I found their 
argument  on liquidity  constraints  due  to the structure of credit markets 
unconvincing.  The figures  in Table 5 do not suggest  that credit markets 
in Ireland looked  so different  in 1988 than they  did in 1984. Moreover, 
the level  of borrowing  is endogenous,  so that any increase  may be the 
result, rather than the cause,  of a consumption  boom. 
How  can one  put  some  structure on  the policy  expectations  view  in 
order to explain  different  reactions  to current deficit changes?  One way 
is to concentrate  on  the importance  of the government's  intertemporal 
budget constraint,  as in the Sargent and Wallace case or in my work with 
Helpman  (1990) on anticipated  future policy switches.  A cut in the defi- 
cit today means  government  debt grows less fast, so that a given level of 
government  spending  tomorrow  is  consistent  with  lower  taxes.  This 
expected  future tax decrease  has current expansionary  effects,  especially 
if it is distortionary  taxes that are cut. 
Though  feasibility  of future policy changes  must form the basis of the 
policy expectations  view,  simple  feasibility according to the government 
budget  constraint  doesn't  yield  a complete  explanation.  There are sev- 
eral reasons.  First, simple  feasibility  allows  a cut in government  spend- 
ing today to be followed  by an increase tomorrow. Why are expectations 
of a move  in a specific direction engendered?  Second,  feasibility doesn't 
explain  why  large fiscal changes  may  have  quite different  effects  than 
smaller changes.  Third, a message  of Table 1 was that deficit reductions 
due to tax increases  are contractionary, in contrast to deficit reductions to 
government  spending  cuts.  Simple  feasibility  says  they  should  have 
similar effects. 
The second  way  to link current and expected  future fiscal variables is 
to argue  that a cut in government  spending  today  may  signal  that the 
government  is  able  to  cut its  spending  and  distortionary  taxes  tomor- 
row  in  a  way  not  previously  thought  possible,  given  political  con- 
straints.  Hence,  the  issue  is  not  simply  what  is economically  feasible, 
but what  is politically  feasible.  The high  deficit policies  that character- 
ized  Denmark,  Ireland,  and Israel prior to their stabilizations  were  fol- 
lowed  because  agreement  could  not be reached  on policy  changes  that 
would  significantly  reduce  the deficit.  Such agreement  may be delayed 
due  to the  distributional  consequences  of fiscal changes.  Alesina  and I 
(1989) have  used  such  a model  to explain  the timing  of policy  changes 
and  specifically  why  stabilizations  that all agents  see  the  need  for are 
delayed.  In  the  Danish  and  Irish  cases,  a  sharp  cut  in  government Can  Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be  Expansionary?  ?  121 
spending  may  thus  indicate  a  change  in  the  process  by  which  fiscal 
policy is made. 
I think a model  of process  switching  is implicitly what proponents  of 
the German view  have in mind.  The idea is suggested  at least informally 
in  the  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  paper,  but  its  implications  are not  really 
drawn out. I think it can explain a number of the empirical observations 
that the earlier feasibility story could not. I also think it is a more convinc- 
ing explanation  than liquidity  constraints  of why  two  Irish experiences 
differed so much from one another. 
Let me sketch what a simple model might look like. Suppose  an agree- 
ment to cut spending  in a sustainable  way implies  a large change in the 
unobservable  mean  level  of  spending.  For simplicity's  sake,  suppose 
there  are only  two  mean  spending  levels,  y2 and  yV, significantly  less 
than  72, where  the  political  process  of choice  of government  spending 
implies  that each  mean  level  of  spending  is highly  persistent.  Denote 
Pr(yt =  yilyt-1 =  yi) by Pi, so that pi is close  to one for i =  1,2. Observed 
spending  is  g,  where  gt  =  yt  +  Et.  Again  for  simplicity,  assume  the 
stochastic part of spending  Et is uniformly  distributed over [:,  -:]. 
Now,  suppose  last  period's  government  spending  gt_-  was  high,  so 
that pr(^yt_  =  y2) is one.  A value gt <  gt-l  of current period government 
spending  is observed.  Has the process  switched,  implying  a persistently 
lower  level  of average  government  spending?  Using  l-p2  as our prior, 
we  can use  Bayes' rule to compute  the posterior probability that yt  =  y, 
conditional  on  our  observation  of  gt.  From  this  we  can  compute  the 
expected  present  discounted  value of future government  spending.  The 
basic question  that Giavazzi  and Pagano ask in terms of policy expecta- 
tions  is how  does  this  change  for a given  observed  change  in current 
government  spending,  gt? 
If gt  >  7i  +  6, the  process  definitely  hasn't  changed.  If y2 -  : < gt 7i  + 
s, the probability that the process has changed  is low as long as P2  is close 
to one.  But if gt <  y2 -  5, the process  has changed  with probability one. 
Hence,  small cuts in government  spending  signal no change in the pres- 
ent  discounted  value  of  future  government  spending;  slightly  larger 
changes  signal  large changes  in expected  future government  spending. 
So the process  switch  model  yields  a nonlinearity. A large deficit reduc- 
tion via a tax increase with no observed  change in gt implies the probabil- 
ity that y = y2  remains high,  and the tax cut is seen as unsustainable.  The 
effects of a deficit reduction  via a tax increase therefore,  are quite differ- 
ent than via a cut in government  spending.  Note further that the process 
switch  model  suggests  a more  sophisticated  way  of forecasting  future 
government  spending  than a simple ARIMA model.  In fact, if the persis- 
tence  of states  is very  high,  an ARIMA will give  very biased  forecasts. 122 *  GIAVAZZI  & PAGANO 
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Discussion 
Robert Gordon  noted  that  the  Keynesian  predictions  for the  effects  of 
fiscal policy  depend  on the  degree  to which  government  spending  and 
private  spending  are substitutes  and  on  the  path  of  monetary  policy, 
both of which  the paper should  focus more on. He also suggested  consid- 
ering  more  foreign  variables,  particularly in  the  investment  equation. 
Giavazzi replied that differences  in foreign circumstances cannot explain 
the different  outcomes  in the two Irish stabilizations  and that Denmark 
emerged  from the recession  in Europe before the rest of the countries so 
it was unlikely  that foreign  demand  was responsible. 
Julio Rotemberg  suggested  that the decrease in government  spending 
may have  reoriented  the  economy  to the  world  economy  and  thus  af- 
fected consumption.  Giavazzi  responded  that it could affect investment 
as well. 
Stanley  Fischer  asked  what  component  of  GNP  rose  to  replace  the 
decline  in  government  spending.  Franco Modigliani  asked  what  hap- 
pened  to savings  after the  decrease  in government  spending.  Giavazzi 
replied  that since  output  fell and  consumption  rose,  saving  must  have 
fallen. 
Lawrence  Summers  suggested  looking  closer  at the  supply-side  re- 
sponse  to the change  in spending  since government  policies could have 
large effects  on individuals'  confidence  about the future. 
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